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DEFINING OMNISCIENCE: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
Daniel Diederich Farmer
In contemporary philosophy of religion, the doctrine of omniscience is typi-
cally rendered propositionally, as the claim that God knows all true proposi-
tions (and believes none that are false). But feminist work makes clear what 
even the analytic tradition sometimes confesses, namely, that propositional 
knowledge is quite limited in scope. The adequacy of propositional concep-
tions of omniscience is therefore in question. This paper draws on the work 
of feminist epistemologists to articulate alternative renderings of omniscience 
which remedy the deficiencies of the traditional formulation.
In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, the doctrine of omniscience 
is typically rendered propositionally as the claim that God knows all true 
propositions (and believes none that are false). There has been some tinker-
ing with it as of late over concerns about de re and de se belief and knowl-
edge, but the definition has by-and-large remained unchanged. Those who 
argue that this whole way of thinking about knowledge (and God’s knowl-
edge in particular) is mostly or entirely wrong-headed are few and far be-
tween. And neither William Alston’s ‘intuitive’ model of omniscience nor 
Linda Zagzebski’s provocative remarks on divine ‘omnisubjectivity’ have 
gained, to my knowledge, any substantial traction in the literature.1
The problems with the propositional version of the doctrine are real, 
however, and my aim in this paper is accordingly to further the case of 
the revisionist camp. Because particular formulations of the doctrine of 
omniscience can only start from particular accounts of ‘good knowing,’ an 
exploration of contemporary work in feminist epistemology, which force-
fully challenges the heavily propositional focus of traditional analytic epis-
temology, may suggest fruitful alternatives for revising our understand-
ing of God’s all-encompassing knowledge. I highlight three developments 
in feminist work that suggest different metaphors for divine knowledge. 
These insights can be synthesized, I shall argue, if we imaginatively recon-
nect omniscience with omnipresence. Some implications of this view are 
explored at the end of the essay.
As always, the purpose of revision can never be revision for revision’s 
sake. It must rather be revision for the sake of greater faithfulness to the 
1See William P. Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” Religious Studies 22.3/4 (1986); and Lin-
da T. Zagzebski, “Omnisubjectivity,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 1, ed. 
J. L. Kvanvig (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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witness of Scripture and the experience of the Church. I trust that my pro-
posal will be evaluated in light of that end.
I
A central thesis of this essay is that the usual renderings of omniscience 
get things precisely backwards, starting with the propositions God sup-
posedly knows, and only later (if at all), getting to the world described by 
those propositions, rather than the other way around. What better way to 
call attention to this oddity than with a brisk walk through some represen-
tative samples from the literature?
As The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy has it defined under ‘di-
vine attributes,’ “Omniscience is unlimited knowledge. According to 
the most straightforward account, omniscience is knowledge of all true 
propositions.”2 In Reason and Religious Belief, the authors suggest that “The 
most immediately obvious way of expressing God’s omniscience is to say 
that God knows everything—or better (since only true propositions can 
be known), that God knows all true propositions.”3 Paul Helseth’s ac-
count is similar: “God’s knowledge is exhaustive . . . because he knows 
all true propositions about everything that has been, is, and will be, and 
he does so in a manner that extends to the minutiae of past, present, and 
future reality.”4 In John Martin Fischer’s words, “God is taken to be om-
niscient. A person is omniscient just in case he believes all and only true 
propositions.”5 Edward Wierenga’s definition is similar: “A being x is om-
niscient =df For every proposition p, if p is true then x knows p.”6 For An-
thony Kenny, this is just common sense: “The doctrine of omniscience is 
easy to formulate precisely: it is the doctrine that for all p, if p, then God 
knows that p.”7 William Lane Craig thinks this is a bit too quick, and pre-
fers: “S is omniscient =df For all p, if p, S knows that p and does not believe 
that ~p.”8 Thus, David Basinger summarizes the consensus nicely: “To say 
that God is omniscient, most philosophers and theologians agree, is to say 
that he knows all true propositions and none that are false.”9
2Edward R. Wierenga, “Divine Attributes,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd 
edition, ed. R. Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
3Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 56.
4Paul K. Helseth, “The Trustworthiness of God and the Foundation of Hope,” in Beyond 
the Bounds: Open Theism and the Undermining of Biblical Christianity, ed. Piper et al. (Wheaton: 
Crossway Books, 2003), p. 275.
5John M. Fischer, “Introduction: God and Freedom,” in God, Foreknowledge and Freedom, 
ed. J. M. Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 4.
6Edward R. Wierenga, The Nature of God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 37.
7Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 10.
8William L. Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: Om-
niscience (Leiden: Brill, 1991), p. 6.
9David Basinger, “Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought,” in Philosophy 
of Religion: Selected Readings, 3rd edition, ed. Peterson et al. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 393.
308 Faith and Philosophy
What does this barrage of exclusively propositional renderings of om-
niscience tell us? Quite simply, that insofar as we ascribe to God only that 
which we find praiseworthy, propositional formulations of omniscience 
reflect the idealization of propositional knowledge in analytic epistemol-
ogy. “It would be fatuously unjustified at best, and blasphemous at worst 
to attribute to [God] some second-rate mode of knowledge.”10 Indeed. The 
corollary is of course that, as our best understanding of ‘good knowledge’ 
evolves, so too should our conception of omniscience.
II
There have been cracks in the foundation of the reductively propositional 
edifice from very early on, even if many have not found them to be threat-
ening. Ludwig Wittgenstein for instance, once a pupil of one of the great 
godfathers of analytic philosophy, Bertrand Russell, offers the following 
caution. “When philosophers use a word—‘knowledge,’ ‘being,’ ‘object,’ 
‘I,’ ‘proposition,’ ‘name’—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one 
must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in 
the language which is its original home?”11 His (well-founded) fear is that 
the systematic search for necessary and sufficient conditions may lead to 
philosophical myopia. The safeguard against such a condition can only 
be to remain attentive to the pluriformity of language. “Compare knowing 
and saying,” he says, “how many feet high Mont Blanc is; how the word 
‘game’ is used; how a clarinet sounds. If you are surprised that one can 
know something and not be able to say it, you are perhaps thinking of a 
case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third.”12 His point, put sim-
ply, is that we commonly call ‘knowledge’ far more than what passes as 
such in philosophical circles (where it is assumed that what is known can 
be said—that knowledge is propositional). As a result, the philosopher 
must either argue that common attributions of knowledge are incorrect 
(or perhaps ‘merely analogous’) or that the assumed philosophical ‘analy-
sis’ of knowledge has been near-sighted.
Likewise, Frank Jackson’s famous ‘Mary the neuroscientist’ thought-
experiment highlights dimensions of what we commonly call knowledge 
that disappear from propositional accounts. Mary, to review, is a specialist 
in the neurophysiology of vision who works in a black and white room 
and investigates the world via a black and white television monitor. In 
spite of her constraints, she acquires ‘all the physical information’ about 
color perception. She knows, in other words, the truth-value of all propo-
sitions concerning human color perception. “What will happen,” won-
ders Jackson, “when Mary is released from her black and white room or is 
given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems 
10Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” p. 298.
11Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, With a Revised Eng-
lish Translation, 3rd edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 
§116.
12Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §78.
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just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual 
experience of it.”13 His point is straightforward: even though Mary in one 
sense ‘knows all the facts’ about color perception before seeing (say) the 
color red, in an important sense, she also learns a new fact when she sees 
red for the first time. Without the experience of red, her knowledge about 
the human brain’s response to ‘red’ electro-magnetic wavelengths is in-
complete. Or, we might say, she knows all the propositions, but doesn’t 
know everything there is to know.14
If propositional analyses of knowledge fail to capture the full scope of 
human knowings, the question arises as to whether previous extrapola-
tions to a doctrine of divine knowing might not also be problematic. The 
forms of knowledge mentioned briefly above are sometimes bracketed in 
traditional epistemology as concerning (merely) ‘procedural knowledge’ 
or ‘knowledge by acquaintance.’ But some disturbances have nevertheless 
made their way over to the philosophy of religion, focused rather techni-
cally on questions of whether knowledge de re (concerning a thing) and 
knowledge de se (concerning oneself, in the first person) can be reduced to 
knowledge de dicto (concerning a proposition).
For human beings, knowledge de dicto need not imply knowledge de 
re, and vice-versa. One may know, for example, that the fat man in the 
doorway is a spy without knowing that the provost of the University is a 
spy, even though the fat man in the doorway is in fact the provost of the 
University (in this case one knows of the fat man, and thus of the provost, 
that he is a spy—knowledge de re—without knowing that ‘the provost is 
a spy’—knowledge de dicto).15 Likewise, one may know that one ought to 
avoid poison ivy without knowing that one ought to avoid this plant here 
(knowledge de dicto but not de re).
With respect to God’s knowledge, however, the consensus seems to be 
that this distinction is of little import. For Wierenga, knowledge de re is a 
species of knowledge de dicto, which means that if God “knows all true 
propositions, then he will have all the de re knowledge there is.”16 Kvanvig 
similarly argues that “the distinction between de re and de dicto beliefs does 
not present a problem for . . . the traditional account of omniscience.”17 
For either belief de re is reducible to belief de dicto, in which case there is 
no problem with the traditional account, or belief de re is not straightfor-
wardly reducible to belief de dicto, but there will nevertheless be nothing 
13Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982) (reprinted in, 
and page number from, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. D. Chal-
mers [New York: Oxford University Press, 2002]), p. 275.
14Zagzebski likewise uses Jackson’s argument to draw out deficiencies in an exclusively 
propositional rendering of omniscience in her essay on divine “Omnisubjectivity.”
15The example comes from Wierenga, The Nature of God, pp. 41–45 (and there seems in 
part inspired by W. V. O. Quine).
16Wierenga, The Nature of God, p. 45.
17Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1986), p. 46.
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lacking in the belief de dicto that is present in the belief de re.18 Because 
Kvanvig takes knowledge to be justified true belief, the criterion of justi-
fication ensures an appropriate measure of ‘epistemic intimacy’ with (at 
least parts of) the object of knowledge in the assertion of God’s knowing 
all true propositions. (Though any exploration of what divine epistemic 
intimacy with the world might look like is lacking.)19
Regarding knowledge de se, the concern is over propositions like “Dan-
iel is thinking” and “I am thinking,” and whether they are different or 
the same (i.e., it is a puzzle concerning indexicals).20 For while God surely 
knows the former, it is controversial whether or not God knows the latter. 
If God fails to know that “I am thinking,” then does this call into question 
propositional renderings of omniscience? The shortest answer is typically 
the preferred one—namely, that if the propositions are actually different, 
omniscience does not require God to know the latter (“I am thinking”). 
And if they ultimately express the same proposition, then the question 
does not arise in the first place.21
Through these and a variety of other maneuvers, the traditional propo-
sitional formulation of omniscience has been defended. Rather than quib-
ble over details of the various defenses, my goal here is to take a step back, 
and to see whether the propositional account is worth defending in the 
first place. Has our understanding of ‘good’ or ‘perfect’ knowing evolved 
sufficiently that exclusively propositional renderings of omniscience have 
been superceded? I submit that this is so, and turn in what follows to re-
cent work in feminist epistemology to make my case.
III
Before moving on, however, I should note my fundamental assumption, 
already hinted at above. This assumption is simply that the doctrine of 
omniscience is formulated in such a way as to ascribe only the ‘best’ kind 
of knowledge to God. The form of knowledge taken to be paradigmatic 
or ‘best’ is inevitably tied to contingent historical and material circum-
stances, and understandably varies over time. This is not to say that all 
such accounts are equal, but only that change and progress are possible 
with increased attentiveness to the kinds of knowings from which current 
formulations of omniscience are derived. Alston’s turn to an ‘intuitive’ 
model of omniscience clearly follows this type of logic. Direct awareness 
of all facts, he argues, though it is “too high an aspiration for our [human] 
18Cf. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All Knowing God, pp. 44–46.
19Zagzebski’s “Omnisubjectivity” begins to fill that gap.
20Wierenga considers (briefly) an account of omniscience that allows for the truth-value 
of propositions to vary according to indexicals of self and time (cf. Wierenga, The Nature of 
God, pp. 186–190). It is not, however, a substantial departure from his fundamentally propo-
sitional account.
21Kvanvig introduces a distinction between direct and indirect grasping of a proposition, 
and accounts for de se knowledge in terms of direct grasping. The proposition “I am think-
ing” on this view is thus identical to the proposition “Daniel is thinking,” even though God 
and I grasp it differently (cf. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, pp. 66–71).
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condition,” nevertheless “represents the fullest and most perfect realiza-
tion of the cognitive ideal.”22 From this he concludes that only this kind of 
knowing is properly ascribed to God. In a similar kind of move, Charles 
Taliaferro argues that omniscience should be reconnected with omnipo-
tence, for “Traditionally the notion of God’s omniscience was conceived 
of as the exercise of God’s omnipotent power.”23 The doctrine of God’s 
omniscience, then, is best thought of as “the claim that it is metaphysically 
impossible for there to be a being with greater cognitive power.”24 This 
insight has been lost, Taliaferro says, “owing to the tendency of contem-
porary philosophical theology to analyze the different divine attributes in 
a piecemeal fashion.”25
In a sense, these deviations from the propositional formulation of om-
niscience represent a search for more adequate metaphors for God as ‘per-
fect knower.’ Here, as elsewhere, the truth of Mark Johnson’s dictum that 
“philosophy is metaphor”26 is apparent. The mode of God’s knowing is not 
beamed down to us on a ray of light; rather, we conceptualize that know-
ing, as best we can, on analogy with human knowing—with the caveat, of 
course, that ‘we see through a glass darkly.’ The negative, critical moment 
of feminist work in epistemology lies in the contention that propositional 
ideals of human knowledge are a philosophical codification of the pur-
portedly ‘scientific’ (and thus, in its historical origins, all-male) preference 
for textbook knowledge, to the exclusion of alternative knowings.27 Thus, 
the positive, reconstructive moment of feminist work recovers forms of 
knowledge marginalized and maligned in traditional epistemology. If 
22Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” p. 297.
23Charles Taliaferro, “Divine Cognitive Power,” International Journal for Philosophy of Reli-
gion 18.3 (1985), p. 135.
24Taliaferro, “Divine Cognitive Power,” p. 133. (He adds also the condition that this maxi-
mal cognitive power be fully actualized.) Craig rejects Taliaferro’s proposal on rather strange 
grounds. Omniscience, he says, “means simply knowledge of all things and has no intrinsic 
connection with power” (Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, p. 10). This strikes 
me more as assertion than argument.
25Ibid., p. 135.
26Mark Johnson, “Philosophy’s Debt to Metaphor,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor 
and Thought, ed. R. W. Gibbs, Jr. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 44. His 
claim, which seems right to me, is that “Philosophical theories, like all theoretical construc-
tions, are elaborations of conceptual metaphors.”
27For a compelling historical example and analysis, see Vrinda Dalmiya and Linda Alcoff, 
“Are ‘Old Wives’ Tales’ Justified?” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. L. Alcoff and E. Potter (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1993). They chronicle “the triumph of propositional knowledge over practi-
cal knowledge” (p. 223) in the Western world during the rise of the all-male universities. The 
dismissal of midwives’ practical knowledge as mere “old wives’ tales” in the beginnings of 
modern medicine was problematic to say the least (and historically lethal on a number of 
fronts). Those disinclined to believe in a connection between the idealization of propositions 
in epistemology and the social idealization of ‘textbook knowledge’ may benefit from medi-
tating on how natural it is for Plantinga to speak about ‘books’ of propositions describing 
worlds (Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity [New York: Oxford University Press, 1979], 
p. 45ff). The point is not to put the blame for the epistemic marginalization of women on 
philosophers, but rather to re-emphasize the dialogical relationship between philosophy and 
popular culture. Patriarchy and prejudice flow too easily from one to the other.
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these alternatives are more adequate in their description of human knowl-
edge, perhaps they can inspire better metaphors for divine knowledge as 
well. I shall argue, then, that feminist work has the potential to free us 
from the mental image of omniscience as “the deity reading off all the 
propositions about the world in his mental encyclopedia.”28
IV
In her “Taking Subjectivity into Account,” Lorraine Code critiques what 
she calls traditional ‘S knows that p’ epistemologies.29 The critique is di-
rected both at the propositional focus of these epistemologies (where 
propositional knowledge is taken as the paradigm for knowledge as such) 
and at the assumption encouraged by the symbolic codification of subjec-
tivity (the particular knower becomes merely ‘S’), namely, that knowers 
are interchangeable. Both dimensions merit careful attention, although I 
focus in what follows only on the former.
Code argues, “If epistemologists require paradigms or other less for-
mal exemplary knowledge claims, knowing other people in personal re-
lationships is at least as worthy a contender as knowledge of everyday 
objects.”30 That is, in taking the ‘S knows that p’ model of knowledge as 
their paradigmatic instance of human knowing, traditional epistemologies 
make primary the knowledge of objects one ‘comes across’—knowledge 
of “cups, spoons, chairs, trees, and flowers”31—things we mostly know 
facts about.32 But, though this is clearly one important form of human 
knowing, it is not obviously emblematic of knowledge as such. “[W]hen 
one considers how basic and crucial knowing other people is in the produc-
tion of human subjectivity, paradigms and objectivity take on a different 
aspect.” For a child “learns to respond cognitively to the people who are a 
vital part of and provide access to her or his environment long before she or 
he can recognize the simplest physical objects.”33 Code’s point is that the 
form of knowledge emphasized in traditional epistemologies presupposes 
the knowing subject’s pre-existing healthy knowledge of other people—of 
whom to trust, whom to listen to, whom to obey, and so forth (children 
learn about trees and cups and tables from the adults with whom they 
are already in relationship, and on whom they have been epistemically 
dependent all along).
28Zagzebski, “Omnisubjectivity,” p. 246.
29Lorraine Code, “Taking Subjectivity Into Account,” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. L. 
Alcoff and E. Potter (London: Routledge, 1993).
30Code, “Taking Subjectivity Into Account,” p. 32.
31Ibid.
32The first lines of Robert Audi’s introduction to his epistemology textbook provide a tell-
ing example: “Before me is a grassy field. It has a line of trees at its far edge and is punctuated 
by a spruce on its left side and a maple on its right. . . . I reach for a tall glass of iced tea, still 
cold to the touch and flavored by fresh mint” (Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the 
Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition [New York: Routledge, 2003], p. 1).
33Code, “Taking Subjectivity Into Account,” p. 32.
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She suggests, as a result, that we explore what we might call ‘S knows S’ 
epistemologies. Knowledge of other persons, after all, appears to be more 
basic and more all-encompassing than mere propositional knowledge. 
One “can know that Alice is clever and not know her very well at all in 
a ‘thicker’ sense. Knowing ‘facts’ (the standard S-knows-that-p substitu-
tions) is part of such knowing, but the knowledge involved is more than 
and different from its propositional parts.”34
Consider what an application of such ‘knowing other persons’ episte-
mologies might look like in the philosophy of religion. In the introduction 
to his The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, Jonathan Kvanvig motivates 
the doctrine of omniscience by quoting Psalm 139:1–4, as follows.
O Lord, you have searched me
and you know me.
You know when I sit and when I rise;
you perceive my thoughts from afar.
You discern my going out and my lying down;
you are familiar with all my ways.
Before a word is on my tongue
you know it completely, O Lord. (NIV)
In this text, Kvanvig argues, “it is difficult to avoid seeing a clear statement 
. . . that God knows all there is to know.”35 And yet in spite of the multiplic-
ity of knowledges ascribed to God in this psalm, which clearly transcend 
the merely propositional, Kvanvig is “convinced that [the traditional] con-
strual remains the proper construal of the doctrine.”36 Might not Code’s 
knowing-other-persons model help retain the richness of the psalmist’s 
praise? For God is not said to know propositions about the psalmist; she is 
said to know the psalmist. God is ‘familiar with’ all the psalmist’s ways—a 
locution intelligible if God’s knowledge is of the psalmist, but which is 
obscured when it is reduced to knowledge of propositions about him. Fur-
ther, the dynamic of immanence and transcendence present in the text 
(‘you have searched me,’ ‘you perceive my thoughts from afar’) is erased 
and flattened—to the benefit of simple transcendence—when God’s thor-
ough knowledge of the psalmist is reduced to knowledge of ‘facts’ about 
him. In brief, propositional reductions of omniscience effect a rejection 
of immanent metaphors for God, a rejection which can be undone by de-
ploying Code’s ‘knowing other persons’ model for knowledge.
Another resource for revitalizing the doctrine of divine omniscience in 
response to its propositional reductions comes from the work of Vrinda 
34Ibid., p. 34. This should not be thought of as knowledge de re, unless the latter is taken in 
its dimension of ‘epistemic immediacy.’ Even then, however, knowledge of another person 
seems to differ substantially in nature from knowledge of an inanimate object. Notice also 
that, in one’s knowledge of a person, it is very difficult to separate the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ 
of knowledge.
35Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, p. ix.
36Ibid., p. xii.
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Dalmiya. In expanding on the work of Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman and 
Linda Zagzebski in virtue epistemology, Dalmiya emphasizes the central-
ity of care both in the process of inquiry and as a characteristic of the 
inquirer. “The heart of the cognitive moment,” she argues, “lies in self-
lessness (what is sometimes termed ‘objectivity’)—where we, along with 
our biases and expectations, recede so that the object of knowledge can 
present itself. Reflection and inquiry,” on her view, “are a constant ex-
amination of whether this submission to the object is complete.”37 The no-
tion of submission to the object of knowledge here is crucial, for it points 
to the centrality of the acknowledgment of the otherness of the object of 
knowledge (person or thing) essential to knowing the other as it, she, or 
he is. The significance of emphasizing care in epistemic exchanges lies in 
the affirmation of the object of knowledge’s autonomy from the knowing 
subject. It must be approached and known as other.
The affirmation of the known’s independence from the knower should 
not be taken as the claim that true knowledge is possible only with a total 
erasure of the knowing subject, for this is of course not possible (nor does 
it seem desirable). Just as it is a mistake to require the object of knowl-
edge’s conformity to the knower in the production of knowledge, so also 
it would be a mistake to require the knower’s total conformity to the ob-
ject of knowledge. Rather, knowledge is produced at the intersection of 
subject and object. Attentive to this connection, Dalmiya argues that “Car-
ing as an adjective of the knower is relevant for all knowledge because it 
signals an effort necessary for both knowledge of things and of selves.”38 
This effort, this caring about knowing the object of knowledge as it is, 
or ‘care-knowing’ of the object, is lost on accounts of omniscience which 
encourage portrayals of God as reading off a list of facts about us. In the 
struggle against “quintessential embodiment[s] of the solitary ruling male 
ego, above the fray,”39 Dalmiya’s emphasis on care-knowing motivates a 
picture of God as engaged with the objects of her knowledge, in an en-
gagement that neither overwhelms nor reduces them. (Thus, instead of 
saying, as Alston does, that “The state of knowledge is constituted by the 
presence of the fact known [to the knower],”40 the point is perhaps better 
put as ‘knowledge is constituted in and by presence of the knower to the 
person or thing known.’)
A final resource to which we will look for the task laid out lies in Ali-
son Jaggar’s recovery of the cognitive dimensions of emotion. She con-
tends that, in its various redefinitions of rationality, modernity simulta-
neously effected a redefinition of emotion. Thus emotions, because they 
were not ‘reason’ (ever the pinnacle of stability, certitude and cognitive 
37Vrinda Dalmiya, “Why Should a Knower Care?” Hypatia 17 (2002), p. 47.
38Dalmiya, “Why Should a Knower Care?” p. 47.
39Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse 
(New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1994), p. 21.
40Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” p. 297.
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perfection), were portrayed “as non-rational and often irrational urges 
that regularly swept the body, rather as a storm sweeps over the land,” 
and as ‘passions’ “imposed upon an individual, something she suffered 
rather than something she did.”41 The epistemological consequence of 
this construction, she notes, is a thoroughgoing mistrust of affectivity. 
The feminist recovery and reconstruction of rationality thus requires 
a reconstruction of emotion as well, particularly in its cognitive and 
epistemic aspects.
“Just as values presuppose emotions,” Jaggar argues, “so emotions 
presuppose values”42—the two are conceptually connected (she points us 
to emotional-evaluative terms to illustrate this connection: “‘desirable,’ 
‘admirable,’ ‘contemptible,’ ‘despicable,’ ‘respectable,’ and so on”).43 
Thus, if we take seriously a valuing of beauty, goodness, and justice, 
then we may not speak of ‘seeing’ or ‘knowing’ these in the world apart 
from emotional engagement. Your knowledge that a friend of yours is 
kind, for example, is part and parcel of your being emotionally disposed 
toward him in a particular way. Your knowledge that a military group 
or corporation has perpetrated an injustice is, again, part and parcel of 
the indignation, anger, and action it elicits from you (here again we see 
the intersection of knower and known).44 And so, “rather than repress-
ing emotion in epistemology it is necessary to rethink the relation be-
tween knowledge and emotion and construct conceptual models that 
demonstrate the mutually constitutive rather than oppositional relation 
between [them].”45
The implications of Jaggar’s work for the doctrine of omniscience are, I 
hope, fairly clear. Traditional propositional construals of God’s knowledge 
say nothing about God’s emotional engagement with her Creation. “I have 
observed the misery of my people who are in Egypt,” reads the account 
of the Exodus; “Indeed, I know their sufferings, and I have come down to 
deliver them from the Egyptians” (Exodus 2:7–8, NRSV). The compassion 
of God, which plays such a central role in the Exodus story, disappears 
in propositional renderings of God’s knowledge. “I know Ephraim, and 
Israel is not hidden from me” (Hosea 5:3, NRSV)—“When Israel was a 
child, I loved him, and out of Egypt I called my son” (Hosea 11:1, NRSV). 
Jaggar’s emphasis on the interconnectedness of knowledge and emotion, 
I submit, helps us to make sense of these affirmations in a way traditional 
formulations of omniscience never could.
41Alison Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,” Inquiry 32 
(1989), p. 152.
42Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge,” p. 159.
43Ibid., p. 160.
44Jaggar is careful to note that “Although our emotions are epistemologically indispens-
able, they are not epistemologically indisputable” (p. 169). That is, just as with our other 
epistemic faculties, proper training and habituation are crucial in the accurate and veridical 
functioning of human emotion.
45Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge,” p. 163.
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V
Drawing from the work of Code, Dalmiya and Jaggar, I have suggest-
ed that an epistemology centered around knowing persons, caring for 
the object of knowledge as autonomous other, and knowing both with 
‘heart’ and ‘head’ might inform alternative renderings of the doctrine of 
omniscience, renderings which avoid the pitfalls of the traditional propo-
sitional formulation. The time has come to explore a possible synthesis of 
these insights.
I hinted above at the idea that propositional formulations of omni-
science suppress metaphors of immanence for divine being and divine 
knowing. While the central importance of God’s transcendence must be 
affirmed, that affirmation must be balanced. These two dimensions of di-
vine being and acting should not be dichotomized in an either/or. The 
proper approach is both/and. For this reason, I propose to remedy the 
deficiencies of the traditional definition of omniscience by grounding om-
niscience in omnipresence.
Elizabeth Johnson notes that “To even the casual observer it is obvious 
that the Christian community ordinarily speaks about God on the model 
of the ruling male human being.”46 Propositional versions of omniscience 
support this model by isolating God in metaphor from the interpersonal, 
other-respecting and affective dimensions of knowledge. The cumulative 
effect of these isolations is a split between God’s epistemic access to Cre-
ation and God’s providential activity in Creation (which appears quite odd 
in light of the tradition’s emphasis on divine simplicity). Better resources 
for ‘naming towards God,’47 then, are provided when we imaginatively 
reconnect God’s knowledge and presence. God knows all, on this model, 
because she is present in all.
E. J. Khamara has addressed (and dismissed) models of omniscience 
which portray God as an ‘omniperceiver’—an idea akin to the one just 
suggested—in his “Eternity and Omniscience.”48 He argues for the con-
ceptual independence of omniscience from affirmations of divine pres-
ence in space or time,49 and suggests that a ‘perceptual’ model of omni-
science is “inappropriate because it assimilate[s] God’s knowledge of his 
own creation to that of a mere spectator.”50 However, it is unclear to me 
how a propositional conception of omniscience fully deflects this charge. 
More to the point, Khamara’s rejection of ‘mere’ perception presupposes 
and requires a sharp distinction between sensing (conceived as a form 
of passivity) and cognizing (conceived as a form of activity). But just as 
human cognition does not occur in a realm of Platonic Forms and human 
46Johnson, She Who Is, p. 33.
47Ibid., p. 62.
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sensing does not entail pure passivity, so also there is no need to imagine 
divine cognition of the world occurring apart from providential activity, 
and yes, ‘experience,’ in the world.51 Because Khamara endorses a sharp 
distinction between rational knowing and perceiving, God of course can-
not be ‘just’ a perceiver. But on this point, Jaggar helpfully reminds us of 
the “necessity for and interdependence of faculties that our culture has 
abstracted and separated from each other: emotion and reason, evaluation 
and perception, observation and action.”52
The crux of the matter, I submit, is the traditional model’s unwilling-
ness to grant the important point that veridical knowledge of a person 
or object requires the would-be knower’s openness to and engagement 
with said person or object. This is true for human beings. It’s unclear 
why it shouldn’t be true for God as well. Exclusively propositional ac-
counts struggle with this real-world meshing of the ‘content’ and mode 
of knowledge. By artificially isolating the ‘what’ from the ‘how,’ and by 
sweeping the ‘how’ under the rug (or ignoring it altogether), we estab-
lish God’s epistemic independence from the world; but the cost of such 
a move is high, and the resulting picture rather problematic. Is not the 
scandal of Creation ex nihilo precisely the mystery that God would cre-
ate a world that is not-God, and that she would therefore have to relate 
to it—be epistemically dependent on it—as other? Against the epistemic 
and providential ‘monergism’ urged upon us by the tradition, I propose a 
metaphor of epistemic and providential synergism, one in which we work 
alongside of and are known by God, just as she works alongside of and is 
known by human beings.53
VI
Before bringing this essay to a close, it may be well worth addressing two 
objections that have not been dealt with in the foregoing. The first objec-
tion I need to address concerns the question of precision in philosophical 
inquiry. Does my analysis not strip the philosopher of religion of his or 
her tools for progress on the philosophical and theological puzzles sur-
rounding divine knowledge? How can one be precise with metaphors like 
‘knowing other persons,’ ‘care-knowing,’ or ‘emotionally engaging with 
the object of knowledge’?
51For more on this theme, see Zagzebski’s “Omnisubjectivity” on God’s ‘perfect total em-
pathy.’
52Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge,” p. 171.
53One of the referees pointed out that “a sizable number of philosophers who define om-
niscience propositionally don’t reject immanent metaphors of God, don’t deny God’s emo-
tional engagement with her Creation, don’t believe God to be in total control, and/or do 
believe that we work alongside of God and that God is in a relationship of interdependence 
with us.” Quite so. The key question is whether or not these philosophers’ acceptance of 
propositional definitions of omniscience is in line with their preferred model for God. In 
light of their synergism, I submit that they would be more consistent to reject (or suitably 
qualify) such definitions.
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For my answer to this question, I can afford to be brief. In the timeless 
words of Aristotle, “Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much 
clearness as the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought 
for alike in all discussions.”54 I am suggesting, in other words, that the 
‘precision’ of traditional propositional renderings of omniscience is an ar-
tificial precision; and, at the end of the day, artificial precision is impreci-
sion. Thus we ought to return to the rough ground(s) of Scripture, reason 
and experience (and in particular to the interpreted experience of women 
and other marginalized persons), which provides a helpful corrective to a 
tradition that has become partially calcified in its insistence on imagining 
God in only one way. This is not a call to imprecise thinking, but rather a 
simple reminder of our limited ability to pin down, once and for all, our 
great Mother and Maker.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, have I made the elementary 
mistake of confusing propositions with sentences? For while sentences 
may be ‘secondary,’ and inessential to knowledge as such, what is meant 
by ‘proposition’ is the deep world-matching structure of a coherent sen-
tence. And surely God must know this!
I do not know if I have confused sentences and propositions because 
it is unclear to me whether or not propositions can be divorced from the 
world they describe. If propositions are ‘necessary beings’ as Plantinga 
and Craig believe, then the dubious ontology is well worth rejecting. Why 
imagine God’s knowledge of the world as mediated through pre-existent 
propositions in the first place? If on the other hand propositions are just 
‘states of affairs’ (or perhaps, even more vaguely, ‘facts’), then proposi-
tional formulations of omniscience may be bland but perhaps adequate or 
useful ways of describing God’s all-encompassing knowledge.
For Taliaferro, omniscience needs to be reconnected to omnipotence. 
We need, on his view, to recover the metaphor of ‘cognitive power.’ But 
if the foregoing is of any worth, then good knowledge requires not just 
that a knower be cognitively well-endowed, but rather also and especially 
that that knower be in relationship. We know best in relationship, and it 
would be a shame to drop that insight when articulating conceptions of 
God’s knowledge. As Charles Taylor notes, contemporary epistemological 
theories “are framed as theories elaborated by an observer about an object 
observed but not participated in.”55 The more fundamental recovery to be 
made then, in my estimation, is less the connection between knowledge 
and power than it is the connection between knowledge and presence.
Though I believe this move is a fruitful one, it might appear danger-
ous to some. If the all-knowing God’s object of knowledge is not ‘books’ 
of propositions but rather the world itself and the people in it, how then 
do we maintain traditional conceptions of providence? For these precisely 
54Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Volume Two, ed. 
J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), NE 1094b12–14.
55Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, Volume One (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 255.
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seem to require some secret, mysterious, or transcendent knowledge in 
God, such that the world-historical process is, in spite of appearances, 
‘risk-free’ from her perspective.56 In short, I do not believe a formulation 
of omniscience revised in the way that I have proposed can ultimately be 
reconciled with so-called ‘meticulous’ conceptions of providential control. 
Neither Alston57 nor Zagzebski would follow me on this point, to be sure, 
but a growing number of Bible scholars, theologians and philosophers 
have questioned the biblical grounding,58 theological viability59 and philo-
sophical consistency60 of such traditional notions of providence. The de-
bate, I am sure, will rage on. I simply note this possible implication of my 
argument for those concerned with how we are to speak of God’s control 
over the world. Perhaps some will take it as a further argument in favor of 
risky models of providence, and others still will take it as a counter argu-
ment to all of the foregoing. Both options may be justifiable.
My patient reader may wonder if any ‘proper’ definition of omni-
science will at this point be given. If I do not define omniscience as God’s 
knowing all and only true propositions, how do I define it? Taking Wit-
tgenstein’s warning61 seriously, so far as I can tell, means resisting this 
urge to make tidy, reductive definitions basic. Such definitions may have 
a limited place in philosophical inquiry, but if our aim is to give a broad 
account of omniscience, then it is the psalmist’s delightfully rich and per-
sonal ‘definition’ which should be taken as exemplary. “You hem me in,” 
he says, “behind and before; you have laid your hand upon me. Such 
knowledge is too wonderful for me, too lofty for me to attain. Where can 
I go from your Spirit? Where can I flee from your presence? If I go up to 
56This kind of logic is clearly at work in Molinism, where God’s foreknowledge of future 
contingents is made possible by the existence of so-called ‘counterfactuals of freedom’—in-
formatively bivalent propositions about future free choices. On this view, the future (insofar 
as it is dependent on free choices) is in itself indeterminate because undetermined; proposi-
tions about the future, however, are (conveniently) subject to the ‘Law of Bivalence.’ “The 
future may therefore be regarded as determinate, though not determined” (Craig, Divine 
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, p. 227). Even a non-propositional formulation of Molinist 
claims, insofar as it would depend on God’s knowledge of individual (unchanging?) ‘es-
sences’ or some such thing, must posit (so far as I can tell) entities—objects of knowledge for 
God—over and above the physical world, without which the future could not be truthfully 
regarded as determinate.
57Alston does claim, however, that any part of God’s knowledge about my action as a free 
agent (for example, what I do at noon today) “is intimately dependent for its constitution on 
what I do at noon today. By doing what I do at noon today I determine the object of this bit of 
knowledge, what is known therein” (Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?”, 301, my emphasis). 
Though Alston intends to defend traditional conceptions of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge, 
calling God’s knowledge ‘transtemporal,’ I fail to see how this is possible in light of the de-
pendence of God’s knowledge on the actual occurrence of this or that free act (cf. William 
Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989], pp. 59–63).
58See, for example, Terence Fretheim’s The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1984).
59See, for example, John Sanders’s The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence, 2nd 
revised ed. (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2007).
60See, for example, Hasker’s God, Time, and Knowledge.
61Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §116, quoted above in section II.
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the heavens, you are there; if I make my bed in the depths, you are there” 
(Psalm 139:5–8, NIV).
A comment of N. T. Wright’s will do quite nicely in bringing this essay 
to its conclusion. Truly Christian accounts of knowing, he argues, “should 
follow the great philosopher Bernard Lonergan and take love as the basic 
mode of knowing, with the love of God as the highest and fullest sort of 
knowing that there is, and should work, so to speak, down from there.”62
An all-loving God—this is a God who can be said to know all things, all 
persons, and to be present everywhere. This is a God whose knowledge 
constitutes a different kind of power from that of the ruling male. This 
God is vulnerable in her transcendence; this God is empathic in her objec-
tivity; this God is present, though indeed, she is wholly Other. In the arms 
of the all-loving God, we know and are known. Our hope, then, lies in 
this. “For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. 
Now I know only in part; then I will know fully, even as I have been fully 
known” (I Corinthians 13:12, NRSV).63
Marquette University
62N. T. Wright, The Challenge of Jesus: Rediscovering Who Jesus Was and Is (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 1999), p. 195.
63I am grateful to Theresa Tobin, Tom Flint, and two anonymous referees for their encour-
agement and feedback. They have contributed much to the quality of this essay. Infelicities 
in form or argument that remain are entirely my own.
